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Capital should flow from rich countries 
to poor countries   because in the neoclasȬ
sical model,  the marginal product of a unit 
of capital is much higher in poor countries 
that are typically labor abundant and capital 
poor.   Second,   more  productive  poor  counȬ
tries should attract more foreign capital beȬ
cause they have the ability to use it better.  
A nd third,  because it adds investible resourcȬ
es,  and because of the collateral benefits of 
foreign capital such as bringing in new techȬ
nologies of production and control,  greater 
use of foreign capital should be associated 
with more growth.
Capital does not flow from rich to poor 
countries in the relative quantities it used to 
   surprising  given  that  financial  markets 
have been getting better.  M oreover,  it is not 
ȱȱȱȱȬȱ Ȭ
tries,  the most productive get the most capital 
 ǯȱ¢ǰȱȱȬȱǰȱ
there does not seem to be a positive associaȬ
tion between growth and reliance on foreign 
capital.  In fact,  there is generally a negative 
ȱȱȱȬ Ȭ
al countries that are more reliant on foreign 
ȱ ȱǯȱȱȱǰȱ
though,  there is a positive association.
Correlation is not causation,  and indeed 
there are both benign and malign explanaȬ
tions of these correlations.  W hat seems to be 
ȱȱȱȬȱȱȱȱ
have  tremendous  absorptive  capacity  for 
foreign  capital  in  general,   though  particuȬ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
be useful.  Put differently,  the relatively low 
use of foreign capital by successful developȬ
ing countries may have more to do with their 
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low demand for foreign capital than with a 
willingness of developed country creditors to 
supply it.
O ne  reason  for  the  low  demand  may 
be their financial system is underdeveloped 
so that when they have growth opportuniȬ
ties, the extra domestic savings they generate 
are largely adequate to cover the investment 
that can profitably be financed. This is a beȬ
nign explanation for the limited role of forȬ
eign capital in development. More malign is 
if foreign capital inflows cause overvaluation 
of the exchange rate, thus reducing the comȬ
petitiveness of the economy, and thus reducȬ
ing manufacturing exports and undermining 
a traditional stepping stone to growth. There 
are  also  concerns  about  foreign  capital  we 
do not address, such as its potentially higher 
volatility, which may make countries other 
than the really needy stay away from it.
O ur conclusion is therefore that in the 
long run, capital account opening is unlikely 
to help poor countries grow by providing reȬ
sources in excess of what is available in the 
domestic  economy    notwithstanding  exȬ
amples of foreign capital led booms and busts 
ȬȬȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȬȱ Ȭ
tries. Put differently, the current patterns of 
flow of capital in the global economy, though 
seemingly perverse, may not be so, at least 
given  the  financial  and  institutional  conȬ
ȱȬȱȱǯȱȱ
does not mean these flows are optimal, safe, 
or sustainable in the long run.
We observed that foreign capital helps 
indirectlyby disciplining policymakers or 
by  promoting  reforms  that  improve  the  fiȬ
nancial system. The authors say it is possible 
to make the opposite argument and find inȬ
direct costs. Plausibly, lifting restrictions on 
capital flows could undermine the domestic 
financial system because spendthrift governȬ
ments can tap a larger pool of funds abroad. 
ǰȱȱ Ȭȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
for reforms at home if they are free to store 
their wealth overseas.
Perhaps, then, the gains from globalised 
finance are latent and will be unleashed once 
¢£ȱȱȱȱǵȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ
will. But the wish list of complementary meaȬ
sures is difficult to tick off. Economies might 
reap the benefits of foreign capital more fulȬ
ly if property rights were stronger, contracts 
were  more  enforceable,  and  if  there  were 
less corruption and financial cronyism. But 
the authors point out that if poor countries 
could carry out such ambitious reforms they 
would no longer be poor and financial gloȬ
£ȱ ȱȱȃȱ¢ȱȱ
sideshow. With so much else to do first, libȬ
£ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȬ
ous policy priority.
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
countries that have profitable ventures that 
lack funding because of low savings at home. 
But Messrs Rodrik and Subramanian argue 
that for many countries, it is not low savings 
but a shortage of good investments that is 
the binding constraint. Weak property rights, 
poorly enforced contracts and the fear that 
profits will be siphoned away make it hard 
to conceive of ventures that might generate 
a reliable return. When investment opportuȬ
nities are scarce, capital inflows simply disȬ
place domestic savings and encourage conȬ
sumption.
The Effects of Foreign Capital on 
State Economic Growth 
U .S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data 
 ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ¢¢ȱȱ
growth  between  1995  and  1999  was  more 
ȱśŖƖȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŞŝȱȱ
ŗşşŚǯȱȱȬȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ¡Ȭ
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ Ȭ
turn in growth. Pooling data for the 50 states 
in a regression framework showed that forȬ
ȱȱȱȱŘǯŜƖȱȱȱ
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱ Ȭ
eign capital made no contribution between 37 Economy
No. 7 ~ 2008
ŗşŞŝȱȱŗşşŚȱȱȱȱřǯŝƖȱȱȬ
ȱ ȱ ȱŗşşśȱȱŗşşşǯȱ Ȭ
more, estimates show that foreign capital had 
a much larger impact on the manufacturing 
ǰȱȱȱȱȱŗŜǯŝƖȱȱ
state manufacturing output growth between 
1995 and 1999 so taking the case of U.S. poliȬ
cy we can se the effects of the foreign capital 
upon the Economic G rowth. 
But why is the attracting of foreign capiȬ
tal unsuccessful sometimes?
Without  inviting  foreign  investors  in 
some developing countries, foreign compaȬ
nies have not responded to their invitations. 
The reason can be the political and economȬ
ical instability in the host country. The one 
ȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱ
ȱȱȬ ȱȂȱ
differ  greatly,  but  it  is  possible  to  identify 
common factors. The main reason in many 
less  developed  countries  was  a  distrust  of 
private enterprise, combined with the socialȬ
ist ideological beliefs. The Indian government 
explicitly stated its intention to retain control 
ȱȱȂȱȂǯȱȱȱ
ȱ ȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȬ
¢Ȃȱȱǯȱ¢ȱȬ Ȭ
can countries strove to avoid dependency or 
the dominance of foreign economic powers.
ȱȱȱȬ ȱȬ
terprises also influence the content of their 
investment promotion materials. They have 
a much broader coalition of members than 
most private enterprises, including their manȬ
agers, boards of directors, government minȬ
isters, civil servants, parliament and politiȬ
cians. Their managers must take into account 
the expectations and various interest groups. 
They  are  expected  to  balance  the  social  as 
well as the commercial costs and benefits of 
their proj ects with a much greater emphasis 
on the social side than in private companies. 
Their goals and obj ectives tend to be broader 
more than in private companies. 
The  characteristics  of  less  developed 
countries  are  the  high  rates  of  unemployȬ
ment,  huge  disparities  between  rich  and 
poor, the relative inefficiency and low purȬ
chasing power of domestic market, the low 
levels of technology, and so on. In addition, 
many  governments  are  influenced  by  the 
Ȃ¢ȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱ
government has to take a very active role in 
ȱ¢Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
pace of development. 
At the personal level many managers in 
state  corporations  face  career  environment 
more similar to civil service than to the reȬ
Ȭȱȱȱȱ Ȭ
panies. The environment may reward them 
ȱȱȱȱȬǯȱȱ
is  a  difference  concerning  subordinates  as 
well, in the American companies there is an 
assigned  real  and  limited  responsibility  to 
ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ£ Ȭ
tions in developing countries often practice 
ȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȂǰȱȱ
which j unior managers are supposed to learn 
their j obs mainly by observation. Often they 
are given only small tasks under close superȬ
vision  until  they  have  been  with  the  orgaȬ
£ȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱ
managers overloaded as they have to spend 
too much of their time reviewing on minor 
matters. They may not be able to rely on their 
subordinates, so they may not be able to deȬ
vote sufficient effort and attention to the difȬ
ficult  and  strategically  important  tasks  of 
ȱȱ£Ȃȱǯȱ
An important difference between AmerȬ
ican executives and state corporation managȬ
ers in LD Cs is that the former tend to strive 
ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ£Ȃȱ
power and independence, while the latter ofȬ
ȱ¢ȱȱȱ£ȱ
to the guidance and control of government 
ministries or boards. The managers of AmerȬ
ican companies assume the bigger risk in the 
hope of bigger result, but managers of state 
owned enterprises do not, because they want 
to avoid the possibility of any failure being 
attributed to their own errors. 38 Economy
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These cultural and environmental charȬ
acteristics  strongly  affect  the  language  of 
documents drafted by state corporation manȬ
agers to attract and influence foreign compaȬ
nies. They are afraid of foreign companies. 
Managers of the state owned companies ofȬ
ten  do  not  understand  the  competitive  atȬ
mosphere and the pressure for financial reȬ
sults that confronts executives at all levels in 
American companies. 
It would be a long, slow and difficult 
process to try to change the ingrained attiȬ
tudes and practices of the State owned enȬ
terprises to make their investment literature 
ȱȬǯȱ
 ǰȱ¢ȱ
know the way how to introduce news withȬ
ȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱ Ȭ
ǯȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ǱȱȂ ȱ¢ȱ
ȱȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȂ ȱ ȱȱȱ
ȱ¢Ȃǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
be concerned primarily with its own welfare, 
with  obtaining  the  coming  foreign  capital. 
But that country should be more effective in 
attracting desirable capital.
Another  problem  is  that  the  corporaȬ
tions owned by the state do not understand 
ȱȂȱǰȱȱȱȱ
¢ȱȱȱǱȱȂȱȱȱ
ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǯȂȱ¢ȱ
would be better to welcome to all proposals. 
It should communicate its eagerness to make 
it easy as possible for foreign companies to 
follow through on their plans. This does not 
mean that hospitality of the corporation or 
the country should allow itself to be exploitȬ
ed or abused by foreign companies. The quesȬ
tion is, whether state rules make good policy, 
as rules are intended to guard against finanȬ
cial and other abuses which the country may 
have suffered in the past, while on the other 
hand they may well be less necessary as the 
local economy becomes more developed and 
ȱȂȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
more sophisticated.
Corporation personnel would not be inȬ
volved in the formative stages of the project, 
but would only see the completed documents. 
They would consider only one proposal at a 
time  if  several  were  to  be  submitted.  They 
need to understand the competitive bidding 
so it is quite possible that confidence comes 
ȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ Ȭ
ers. 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
way. Proposal evaluation is too important to 
be slighted in this way and careful attention 
should  produce  some  good  rewards.  They 
could have much more confidence in a feasiȬ
¢ȱ¢ǯȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ
some of their own people working with the 
prospective investor while the study is beȬ
ing carried out. Otherwise, it is too easy for 
the investor to manipulate the study so as to 
make the proposal look better for the host 
country than it really is. If the management 
were overloaded, they could assign more juȬ
nior people to work intensively with the forȬ
eign company. 
H aving submitted one investment proȬ
posal at a time also has many disadvantagȬ
ǯȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ Ȭ
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱ
strengths and weaknesses of a given proposȬ
al if they took the time to work through sevȬ
eral of them and could compare them. They 
can increase their ability to bargain for betȬ
ter terms if they had proposals from several 
competing foreign companies.
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